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Abstract. Safety is one of the most important development goals for
highly automated driving (HAD) systems. This applies in particular to
the perception function driven by Deep Neural Networks (DNNs). For
these, large parts of the traditional safety processes and requirements
are not fully applicable or sufficient. The aim of this paper is to present
a framework for the description and mitigation of DNN insufficiencies
and the derivation of relevant safety mechanisms to increase the safety of
DNNs. To assess the effectiveness of these safety mechanisms, we present
a categorization scheme for evaluation metrics.
Keywords: AI Safety ·Automated Driving ·DNN Insufficiencies · Safety
Mechanisms · Evaluation Metrics.
1 Introduction and Big Picture
A massive number of academic publications deal with the use of DNNs for the
realisation of HAD. The strong performance of DNNs on perception tasks raise
optimism that HAD systems will become reality in the foreseeable future. In
order to see HAD vehicles on the road, there is relevant challenges with regard
to certifications, public trust, acceptance, validation and legal regulations to be
overcome. One of the major challenges in the industrialization of safety-critical
autonomous systems such as HAD is safety.
There are numerous standardized quality management and engineering pro-
cess requirements that ensure an acceptable level of safety for road vehicles. So
far, it has been largely neglected that HAD systems require a vehicle environment
perception and decision making that is carried out with an intended function-
ality. At the beginning of 2019, the ISO/TC 22 Technical Committee presented
a draft on the absence of unreasonable risk due performance limitations of the
intended functionality, which is specifically free from the faults addressed in
the ISO 26262 series - called ISO/PAS 21448 (abbreviation SOTIF) [2]. The
performance limitations include sensor performance-, actuator technology- and
algorithms-limitation (e.g. machine learning). However, the consideration of ma-
chine learning algorithms is restricted to the automation level SAE-2, where the
driver serves as the fallback-level and is thus responsible for the final monitoring
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Fig. 1. Inherited and acquired reasons causes the DNN insufficiencies that lead to
errors and depending whether they are critical to failures. The acquired reasons and
DNN insufficiencies are mitigated by safety mechanisms that automatically lead to a
mitigation of errors. The success of the mitigation is measured by evaluation metrics.
of the system (e.g. failure detection and risk mitigation) [13]. In addition, the
considerations are very general and lack technical depth and practical use. For
these reasons, it would be beneficial to start new standardization efforts or to
extend existing ones.
Argumentation approaches in an assurance case [1] are promising concepts
to approach this challenge [6]. The aim of an assurance case in this context
is to provide a convincing argumentation about the fulfilment of the safety
goals. The argumentation includes evidence of compliance with the safety re-
quirements derived from the safety goals, taking into account the operational
context. The evidence can be carried out in a statistical manner and by means
of well-documented design processes.
A considerable part of this argumentation deals with the mitigation of errors
of the DNN predictions. Those errors may be purely performance-related (e.g.
false-positive or false-negative detections or localization inaccuracies) or less ob-
vious flaws such as unreliable confidence behavior or a non-answer of the DNN.
In other words, it is an erroneous behavior that might lead to an overall system
failure (see section 4).
Errors are caused by DNN insufficiencies3 which are described in more detail
in section 3. These describe the negative traits that DNNs naturally have and
which the training process could reinforce. We divide them into five categories,
which cover the input, the internal functioning and the output of the DNN and
provide one example for each category:
3 We consider DNN insufficiencies and negative DNN traits as synonyms.
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1. Lack of generalization: The lack of generalization ability becomes apparent
when the input data differs in its data distribution from its training data
set. The data distribution can be inside or outside the input space defined
in the ODD.
2. Lack of robustness: A lack of robustness means a reduction in performance
due to perturbations that are present in the input data, such as noise on the
sensors (e.g. dust, dirt or smashed insects on camera lens).
3. Lack of explainability: The lack of explainability refers to the internal func-
tioning of the DNN. For example, it is unclear which rules were decisive for
the DNN to reach its outcome.
4. Lack of plausibility: The lack of plausibility refers to the output of the DNN:
the prediction. For example, plausibility concerns the prediction of physically
impossible pedestrian sizes or shapes.
5. Lack of efficiency: The lack of efficiency refers to the expected inference time,
the number of required operations and parameters as well as the required
memory. This is especially relevant considering the benefits of redundan-
cies to improve safety and the limited hardware resources available in the
application.
The causes of the insufficiencies are divided into two categories following the
nature vs nurture debate [7]: Inherited and acquired reasons (see Fig. 1).
Inherited reasons arise from the underlying principles of current AI technol-
ogy (see subsection 3.1 for more details). Acquired reasons (see subsection 3.2)
are related to the development process of DNNs and have an impact on DNN
insufficiencies: Operational Design Domain (abbr. ODD) and data set specifi-
cation, DNN topology design choices, training process and postprocessing. For
example, an unbalanced data set with respect to the applied optimization goal
might lead to a reinforcement of DNN insufficiencies. It is therefore important
not only to mitigate the negative traits that the DNN innately has, but also to
positively influence the acquired reasons.
To minimize the DNN insufficiencies, so-called safety mechanisms are used.
Safety mechanisms include methods for the analysis of safety-relevant aspects of
the DNN, as well as safety-enhancing steps based on the analysis results. The
relevant analyses cover all stages of the development process.
In order to make the increase in safety measurable, corresponding evaluation
metrics must be defined. They give the safety mechanisms a benchmark and
possible plausibility check of their success in increasing safety. In addition, the
evaluation metrics are used by the assurance case to assign statistical evidence
or guarantees to the assumptions.
The main contribution of the paper is to formulate a strategy on how DNN-
based perception functions for HAD can be made safe. At the same time the
paper should not be seen as comprehensive and valid strategy to increase DNN
safety that can be used in industry.
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2 Related Work
The research on automotive safety standards and processes for DNNs is quite
scarce as it lies in between two research fields: Safety and machine learning.
There are currently few publications available that attempt to bridge the gap
between these areas:
Within the UL4600 (current draft version available from [3]) and the recent
whitepaper “Safety First for Automated Driving” contain collections, challenges
and recommended design principles to reach safety for machine learning. Even
though they contain a lot of useful guidelines and requirements, they lack a con-
cise overview of the sources of DNN insufficiencies. Existing literature within the
research field of machine learning seems to be more concentrated on subdomains
such as explainable AI, adversarial robustness or dependable AI. Here, a concise
overview and, in particular, research on interconnections between these topics
seems to be missing.
3 DNN Insufficiencies
DNN insufficiencies describe systematic and latent weaknesses of DNNs that
they possess due to inherited and acquired reasons. They can cause an error in
the inference when faced with triggering data (triggering event). It is important
to identify the DNN insufficiencies in order to deal with them adequately in
the argumentation in the assurance case using safety mechanisms as mitigation
methods. We propose a division into five categories for which we claim to provide
comprehensive coverage of DNN insufficiencies. The properties become apparent
when the input data is changed (lack of generalization ability and robustness),
by questioning the inner workings (lack of explainability), by analyzing the pre-
diction (lack of plausibility) and by considering the hardware requirements in
the application (lack of efficiency). We provide some examples each to increase
the understanding of what is meant by the individual points:
The lack of generalization is noticeable when the input data changes in its
underlying data distribution compared to the training data. This leads to a re-
duction in the accuracy of the DNN prediction, depending on the quantity of
distribution change. The data distribution can be inside or outside the input
space defined in the ODD. Changes in the visual appearance of objects or traffic
scenes in general can lead to a shift in the data distribution that is still in the
domain. These can be caused by different weather and lighting conditions or by
different car brands, wall decorations and pedestrian clothing. Other appearances
can lead to leaving the domain and cause a domain shift. For example, given
a DNN-based scene understanding, which was trained with European-looking
cities would have a lower accuracy in the Asian region. Furthermore, a change
in the sensor setup, e.g. a change in the viewing angle due to a change in the
mounting position or a change in the sensor characteristics, e.g. a different cam-
era lens or sampling rate of the LiDAR sensor, also have a negative impact on
the accuracy.
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The lack of robustness means a reduction in performance of the DNN due
to perturbations that are present in the input data. Such perturbations can be
noise on the sensors caused by dust, dirt, rain drops or smashed insects. Further
perturbations may occur due to errors in the transmission of sensor data to
the DNN (e.g. packaging loss due to buffer overflow). A serious perturbation is
adversarial attacks, which are hardly visible or non-suspicious to humans, but
can completely change the DNN prediction. The corresponding patterns can be
applied as foil or stickers to objects [15] or directly to the camera lens [28].
The lack of explainability refers to the internal functioning of the DNN and
can become apparent by questioning the inner workings. It is not possible to
rigorously explain which features in the input were relevant for the DNNs deci-
sion and which rules led to the respective decision. Also the verification of the
learned representation (e.g. for object recognition, what does a prototype object
for the DNN look like?) is not possible innately.
The lack of plausibility refers to the output of the DNN: The prediction
(e.g. semantic segmentation) and the confidence values which can be obtained
by probabilities from softmax distributions. For example, a DNN for pedestrian
recognition detects pedestrians at positions that are excluded by physical laws.
Another examples are predictions of shapes and sizes of objects that are not
plausible. The problems with confidence estimation are that false predictions
are sometimes predicted with high confidence (keyword: unknown unknowns)
and generally the modern DNNs tend to be overconfident [21].
The lack of efficiency refers to the DNN itself and describes the efficiency
properties of the DNN. These are for example inference time, the number of
required operations and parameters as well as the memory requirements. The
consequences of a lack of efficiency result from the consideration of hardware
resources in the application. Hardware resources are very limited with regard
to HAD systems that realize a large number of functions. This can lead to
restrictions in the general DNN selection as well as in the redundancy strategy,
which in turn affects safety.
Generally, insufficiencies are hard to measure and detect as they only get
apparent on particular data (triggering event) when they cause measurable er-
rors. The reasons for the DNN insufficiencies can be divided into two reasons in
analogy to the age-old nature vs. nurture debate: Inherited and acquired reasons.
3.1 Inherited Reasons (Nature)
Inherited reasons concern the underlying principles by which the current AI tech-
nology works. It is questionable whether these principles can be used to simulate
e.g. common sense, which would be helpful for a fundamental improvement of
DNN insufficiencies. Current work in this area falls under the field of Artificial
General Intelligence (abbr. AGI) and is often based on the foundations of the
biological model - the human brain [14].The directions of these works are very
different and short-term successes are estimated to be low [20]. For these reasons
we do not treat the inherited reasons and accept them as given.
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3.2 Acquired Reasons (Nurture)
Acquired reasons describe all the influences we can exert, based on the underlying
AI technologies. We refer to the following processes used in the development
of DNNs: Specification- (ODD, data), DNN topology design choices, training-
and postprocessing process. Errors within these processes reinforce the DNN
insufficiencies. We consider DNN topology design choices to be acquired reasons
and not to be inherited reasons because we claim that all DNN topologies are
based on the same underlying principles.
4 Errors and Failures
When a DNN suffers from a DNN insufficiency and is provided with particular
data (“triggering event”), it produces an error, i.e. a measurable malfunction
of DNNs. They can be manifold ranging from imprecisions to incorrect self-
assessment and usually stem from a DNN insufficiency being exploited by par-
ticular data. Examples of error types are the following: False positive detection;
False negative detection; Unreliable confidence estimate; Too long computation
time; Wrong size or location estimate.
Depending on which system the DNN is integrated into and how critical the
situation is, this will lead to a failure of the affected system A failure refers
to a malfunctional state of the overall HAD system (e.g. unnecessary braking
of an autonomous vehicle). It is important to understand that not every error
leads to a failure. It is an important goal of safety mechanisms on module level
to mitigate DNN insufficiencies while safety mechanisms on system level aim at
mitigating the effect of module errors in order to prevent failures.
Fig. 2. The DNN insufficiencies can be divided into five categories. DNN insufficiencies
are minimized by safety mechanisms that are structured along the development process
of DNNs. The concrete connection between them (see the three arrows) remains part
of future work. The evaluation of the safety mechanisms on the basis of their success
in mitigating DNN insufficiencies is achieved via evaluation metrics.
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5 Safety Mechanisms
In order to mitigate DNN insufficiencies, safety mechanisms (in short: mecha-
nisms) are used (see Fig. 2). They achieve this on the one hand by mitigating
the acquired reasons and on the other by directly improving the DNN traits. All
actions that pursue this goal are called mechanisms. This includes, for example,
analysis tools that measure safety-relevant aspects in the data set or the DNN
itself and, based on their results, perform out safety-enhancing measures. In ad-
dition, these can be network structure and training process changes. A detailed
list of mechanisms along the development process of DNNs is presented in the
following. We also provide a brief description of why the mechanisms can be
used to minimise DNN insufficiencies as well as some hints on concrete usable
approaches.
5.1 DNN Topology Design Choices
The choice of the DNN topology design is divided into the architecture selection
for the DNN and the redundancy strategy that can be followed to make the
solution of the task even safer. Architecture design:
Architecture Search: The architecture design is based on an architecture
search strategy whose goal is finding the optimal network topology by means
of an automatic process. It has been shown that architecture search can be su-
perior to human handcrafted design [10]. If the criteria by which the automatic
process searches for a suitable design are met, not only on prediction quality
metrics (see subsection 6.1) but also on safety metrics (see subsection 6.3), this
may reveal previously unknown designs. DNN class: The choice of the DNN class
has an influence on important properties of the DNN. Most DNNs for classifica-
tion and regression tasks are CNN based. However, CNNs do not take advantage
of the temporal consistency present in video data. The choice of recursive net-
works or recursive architectures such as LSTMs, GRU and their bidirectional
variants can bring this advantage. Capsule networks enable equivariance instead
of translations invariance [34]. A careful selection must be made according to
the specific task and security requirements. Redundancy strategy:
Ensemble: An ensemble of networks consists of different architectures that
are based on different modalities or have been trained with different hyperparam-
eters or data sets. By combining the predictions in a suitable way, the different
properties can be combined for improvement [22]. Networks with a different accu-
racy vs. runtime tradeoff are also conceivable, so that networks with particularly
good quality and great robustness can serve as a reference for faster networks
and thus enable self-monitoring. At the same time, this offers an increase in func-
tional safety, since in the event of a network malfunction, other networks can
perform the same task. Sensor fusion: The sensor fusion takes place on different
levels depending on the fusion concept. A sensor fusion at sensor level is just as
conceivable as a fusion at feature or regression level. LiDAR and camera sensors
are often used for fusion [19]. The fusion concepts provide the network a richer
feature base, allowing the DNN to extract better feature correlations from the
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higher quality database. In addition, the advantages of the corresponding sensor
technologies can be combined.
5.2 Preprocessing
Preprocessing refers to the optimization of the training data set.
Adversarial training: Adversarial examples are input data that have been
manipulated in such a way that they fool the DNN and are not visible to us
humans. In adversarial training the adversarial examples are included in the
training data. According to the number of adversarial examples added to the
training and the technique by which they are generated, an increased robustness
of the DNN is reported [18][36].
Data Augmentation: Data augmentation extends the training data to achieve
greater quantity and diversity. The most common augmentation techniques are
cropping, padding, horizontal flipping and rotations. More advanced techniques
can further enhance the benefits of data augmentation. For example, [12] uses
16 geometric and color-based transformations, using reinforcement learning as
the search algorithm to determine them. [32] have presented a parameterizable
gaussian noise injection technique where the noise intensity can be learned. The
added noise can be seen as a kind of regularization, making the DNN more
robust against adversarial examples.
5.3 Training
Training refers to the training process of the DNN.
Loss function: The optimization goal in the training process for DNNs is
called the loss function. Its selection requires careful attention to describe im-
portant properties of the task to be solved as well as additional regularization
objectives that may arise from safety considerations. Most existing loss func-
tions such as mean square error or cross-entropy were designed with the primary
goal of reaching fast convergence to highly accurate models - additional safety re-
quirements such as robustness or explainability are not considered in this respect.
An example of more safety-focused training paradigms would be the increased
recognition of pedestrians along the driving path. The weighting of the individ-
ual classes is another possible variable to improve the safety of the resulting
network. For mere accuracy, a balanced class distribution [25] provides the best
benchmark values, but in terms of safety this is not necessarily better [8].
Student-teacher approaches: The idea behind the Student Teacher approaches
is that an already trained DNN with high quality (teacher network) is taught
to a DNN with lower quality (student network) by using the predictions of the
teacher network as pseudo ground truth for the student network. It is expected
that this will lead to a compression of the knowledge of the teacher network into
the student network. This process does not require any labelled data, so large
amounts of data can be used for training. Extensions of this approach are used,
for example, to increase the robustness of DNNs against adversarial examples [4].
Strategy to Increase the Safety of a DNN-based Perception for HAD Systems 9
5.4 Postprocessing
Postprocessing refers to the process after training the DNN.
Calibration: Modern networks tend to be over-confident. This sometimes
leads to false predictions which are still assigned a high confidence. Calibra-
tion techniques, as compared in [21], can help. Even simple methods such as
temperature scaling - a single parameter variant of Platt Scaling - can be seen
as an effective calibration.
5.5 Testing, Validation and Verification
The following mechanisms are used to test, validate and verify the trained DNN
in an offline mode.
Heatmap methods: Previous uses of heatmaps have concentrated on classi-
fication tasks, where the heatmap displays the image areas that have played a
relevant role in classifying the image into a certain class [9][30]. This information
can be used for offline verification of the learned. The evaluation of these heat
maps by a human expert can reveal errors in the model (see [27]). For exam-
ple, in the case of pedestrian recognition, it could be revealed that the DNN
considers only parts of the pedestrian to be relevant for decision making, which
would result in the pedestrian not being recognized in the case of corresponding
occlusion.
Formal verification: The verification of safety-relevant properties of a DNN
as well as the description of the input space (naturally occurring and unusual
inputs) for which the DNN shows a safe behaviour is the task of formal veri-
fication. Formal and rigorous guarantees can be issued by exploiting the DNN
piecewise linear structure and taking insights from formal methods such as Sat-
isfiability Modulo Theory (abbr. SMT) [24][5]. Previous approaches mainly deal
with classification and regression tasks and make a variety of assumptions that
do not apply in reality and thus do not allow for complete guarantees [23]. A
decisive limitation of formal verification is the scalability of the approaches, so
that they are not transferable to state-of-the-art DNNs so far.
Testing: In addition to existing testing methods in the field of machine learn-
ing (i.e. careful withholding of an unseen subset of training data for assessing
the resulting performance of DNNs) and automotive products (i.e. covering a
maximum complete range of semantic scenarios) testing in an “adversarial fash-
ion” may support the resulting safety of the DNN. Hereby, testing is performed
in order to find particular weaknesses of DNNs. These corner cases can stem
from semantically complicated situations or slight perturbations of the input
that confuse the DNN.
5.6 Online Monitoring
Online monitoring refers to the monitoring of DNNs during runtime.
Uncertainty modelling: HAD systems will operate in an open world contain-
ing uncertainties due to the limited availability of information and the influence
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of random effects. In addition to this, model uncertainties arise due to imper-
fections within the training data set. Monitoring and reporting of resulting un-
certainties to the perception of HAD systems addresses this circumstance as
the softmax output of DNNs tends to overestimate the model confidence [21].
Possible approaches to report uncertainties besides the perception output are
manifold: Bayesian networks output a statistical uncertainty, sampling-based
technologies approximate this approach [17] but come with run time challenges.
An addition to this, sample free improvements of uncertainty estimates have
been suggested [33][31].
Out-of-Distribution (abbr. OOD) detection: If the input data is drawn from
a different distribution than the training data, this can lead to a reduction in
DNN performance. The extent of this reduction depends on the size of the shift
in the data distribution. Under these circumstances, safe operation can no longer
be ensured, which is why the recognition of OOD situations during runtime and
application of the DNN is needed. If ODD situations are detected reliably at
the input this information can be taken into account in a subsequent fusion in
order to adjust the vehicle behavior (e.g. reduction of speed). OOD data can be
recognized by PCA, various types of (variational) autoencoders and generative
adversarial networks [26].
5.7 Maintenance
This subsection deals with the maintenance of DNNs which become necessary
during use or after a certain time in use.
Sensor setup changes: Due to the increasing demands from the automotive
industry, sensor development is achieving a high level of dynamics. This results
in regular innovations of the sensors that are installed in the vehicles. The mod-
ified sensor properties, however, lead to a reduction in the performance for the
DNNs that were learned with the previous sensor technology. Re-learning the
DNNs requires the creation of new training data generated with the modified
sensor technology. This procedure is extremely costly and time-consuming. A me-
thodical procedure for transferring the learned DNNs can be found in Transfer
Learning. By specific modification of the parameters of the DNNs, an adapta-
tion or abstraction to the new sensor technology is achieved. Possible approaches
include self-ensembling methods and additional loss functions: Self-Ensembling
methods, for example a student-teacher approach are used to modify the DNN
parameters in a semi-supervised fashion [16] or a GAN-based data augmenta-
tion takes place to fine-tune the DNN [11]. Additional loss functions minimize
the difference between source and target correlations in the intermediate feature
maps of the DNN. Conventional approaches are for example the Coral loss [35]
and Maximum Mean Discrepancy based Loss functions [29]. New appearances of
objects: It is foreseeable that objects will change their appearance or that new
objects will be come along. The DNN must be modifiable so that it can deal
with these changes. In concrete terms, this can mean that a DNN is learning
a new class, which must not have any negative effects on the other classes. No
recommendations for possible mechanisms can be made on this point.
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Failure report: Further open questions concern the reporting of failures as well
as the detection of failures in the application. Furthermore, the determination of
the cause of these failures plays a decisive role in proposing suitable mechanisms
on the basis of this information.
6 Evaluation Metrics
Evaluation metrics are used to assess the mechanisms of effectiveness in mitigat-
ing DNN insufficiencies. Evaluation metrics also offer the possibility of bench-
marking the mechanisms, which compares the mechanisms and allows the se-
lection of the most effective ones. We distinguish between metrics that refer to
the quality of the DNN prediction (prediction quality metrics), the safety of
the DNN (safety metrics), the efficiency of the DNN (efficiency metrics) and
the quality of the data set (data metrics). The differentiation of the metrics are
mainly based on the input required for the calculation and on the objective they
are intended to achieve.
6.1 Prediction Quality Metrics
The input data for calculating the prediction quality metrics (abbr. PQM) are
the predictions of the DNNs such as semantic segmentation, bounding box de-
tection or depth estimation and the ground truth. Appropriate PQM are for
example IoU, area under the ROC curve, root mean squared error, F1 score
etc. PQM can be used to test the robustness and generalization capability of
the DNN by modifying the test data accordingly (e.g. overlaying the data with
perturbations).
6.2 Efficiency Metrics
The efficiency metrics indicate the efficiency of the DNN together with its mech-
anisms. A distinction is made whether the efficiency only concerns the DNN itself
or is measured together with the mechanisms during validation or online mon-
itoring. The efficiency includes the runtime, the number of required GFLOPs
and parameters as well as the model size required for saving.
6.3 Safety Metrics
Safety metrics should be seen as an important complement to the PQM and allow
statistically valid statements about key safety aspects of DNNs. They differ from
PQM by the fact that their calculation is performed on the basis of mechanisms
that rely on the internal structure of the DNN, e.g. heat maps, interpretations
of feature maps, uncertainty maps etc. Safety metrics are hardly researched in
the current research landscape, especially not to the extent and quality that is
required in the automotive industry.
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6.4 Data Metrics
Data Metrics evaluate the quality of the data sets that are used to train, vali-
date and test the DNN. The data sets are derived from the input space specified
in the ODD. A balanced training data set is crucial for the DNNs appropriate
robustness and generalization capability within the specified input space. The
measurement of the coverage level and the density of the coverage of the input
space are conceivable data metrics for which, to the authors’ best knowledge,
there are no solid approaches. Other conceivable data metrics concern the cre-
ation of ground truth in terms of accuracy and consistency. When using synthetic
data, data metrics can evaluate realism.
7 Conclusion and Future Work
We have developed a strategy to increase the safety of a DNN-based perception
for HAD systems. This strategy provides for mitigating the DNN insufficiencies,
which we have divided into five categories and described, which we equate with
increasing safety. The reasons for the DNN insufficiencies have been divided
into inherited and acquired reasons in analogy to the nature vs nurture debate.
To mitigate the DNN insufficiencies we have presented a variety of potential
safety mechanisms along the development process of DNNs. Furthermore, we
have introduced a notation of potential evaluation metrics that can be used to
measure the safety of DNNs. This allows the evaluation of the safety mechanisms
with respect to their potential to increase the safety of a DNN and to use them
as criteria for a benchmark. This strategy represents a first draft to pave the way
to an industrial consensus. In future work, we will further evaluate the potential
of the presented safety mechanisms and establish a concrete link to the DNN
insufficiencies. Furthermore, we will work on concrete safety and data metrics to
develop statistically relevant and valid evaluation metrics for the measurement
of DNN safety.
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